

## KEATING AND THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE SOVIET BUILDUP IN CUBA

## I - The October Crisis

The Soviet buildup began, apparently, in July, 1962. The government knew about it, as there had been two intelligence overflights per month all during that year, weather permitting. Keating and others expressed concern. In September, 1962, the flights were stepped up to four during the month. As the buildup was defensive in character, there was no panic, only apprehension, in this country.

On Friday, August 31, Keating first used intelligence reports on Senate floor. If Messrs. Evans and Novak are to be believed, he received a telephone report from an Eastern reporter concerning the unloading of 1,200 Russian troops at the Cuban port of Mariel—information that reporter had already published in a story in his paper on August 9, three weeks before. At this time the Administration was saying that only "technicians" were on Cuban soil, Evans and Novak claimed, so Keating concluded that the tip could be used. He paraphrased the story in the Senate, saying he believed "it should be reported to this body at once." For this he was invited to appear on the Tuesday, September 4, TODAY television show. On Monday, Sept. 3, Keating read a story in the Herald Tribune by Keith Morfett of the London Daily Mail, reporting that 5,000 to 8,000 Russian soldiers had arrived in Cuba. Keating incorporated this added information in his remarks on the TODAY show the next morning. In that show, the following points were made:

President Kennedy had said at a news conference the previous week that there were only technicians, no members of the Soviet armed forces in Cuba.

Saturday the Soviet and Cuban gov'ts had issued a communique saying the Soviets were building up Cuban armed forces with arms deliveries and military technicians. Did this mean anything new? No, said a State Dept. official.

Keating had told Martin Agronsky that he had "new information which will document his contention."

Keating said he had been unduly modest, that instead of 1200 military personnel in fatigue uniforms there were more likely 5,000. 20 ships had brought them and military equipment. 10 more ships coming: 1 East German, 1 Norwegian, 1 Italian, 1 Greek, 1 W. German, and 4-6 ships carrying Liberian flgg. 4 British ships now going to Black Sea to pick up cargo and personnel. These ships, like those already landed, carry trucks, jeeps, food, guns, ground to air missiles, electronic equipment and other material. The administration was, even after his Friday speech, still insisting there were no military forces there.

When Agronsky asked what his documentation was, Keating said he was not going to compromise his sources, that the gov't had the information—they "must have the information which I, as one Senator, was able to procure." That many press people have the information, and "it is a fact—I state it as a fact."

As for the reasons why he was making such information public, Keating said: "I think the American people should be told these things." "It may be that he (the President) feels that the American people should not be told these facts, that they might become jittery or something of that kind." he said he thought we could stand up to the facts.

When asked about the intentions of the Soviet gov't, he said he couldn't be positive, but he had a "very good idea." To wit: to "bolster the morale of the Cubans," and with the landing boats (previously unmentioned) "with their Russian counterpart," "to make landings in other Western hemisphere areas. I don't mean the United States; And, "With all this electronic equipment there, and with Cape Canaveral only 90 miles away, and with the capability of the Russians to do it, which I have checked with technicians in and out of gov't, there is no doubt in my mind that part of it is in order to interfere with our...space operations at Cape Canaveral....They have the capability to almost completely nullify the Cape Canaveral operation."

From September 4 to October 9, Keating made 15 speeches on the Senate floor dealing with the Cuban situation. Most were repetitious of what had been said before, but he also asserted that stronger action was required, regardless of what the facts show. He criticized the hair-line distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, and the suppression of information by the Administration, as well as advocating the prevention of NATO flag shipping to Cuba. On Oct. 2 he spoke of the unloading of crates so large that special unloading machinery was required, so secret that it all had to be done under cover of night, by Russians or Czechoslovaks. The containers were so long that two railroad cars were necessary to haul each one. On October 9, he reviewed all his comments, remarked upon Sec'y Ball's admission of the presence of anti-aircraft missiles, but did not mention missiles of any other kind. During this period, of course, Americans became increasingly tense about Cuba.

It was in that atmosphere that Keating announced, on Oct. 10 in the Senate chamber, the following information:

Construction has begun on at least 6 launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles. ground-to-ground missiles can be operational within 6 months

Keating did not have fully confirmed information on this matter when he made his Oct. 9 speech, and since then confirmation had been made.

The President and top gov't officials "must have" been advised of these facts. Parts of the speech were highly rhetorical—he spoke of Cuba having "the power to hurl rockets into the American heart-land and as far as the Panama Canal Zone." He emphasized that his sources, which "have been 100 per cent reliable" had confirmed his information. He dwelt, finally, on the mystery which had been drawn around Cuba by the Administration, expressed disbelief that they believed any more that the buildup was purely defensive. He ended with the appeal: "Mr. President, let us have all the facts, and have them now."

Subsequent analysis of this speech and its circumstances has uncovered the following:

The Soviets intended to build only 4 intermediate range sites and 6 medium range sites. Construction was not far enough along on some of the sites for anyone to be able to recognize them as missile installations. (Hilsman)

Thomas L. Hughes said in a report to Bundy that this discrepancy was the only "technically and provably erroneous" aspect of Keating's remarks during the entire period of the Cuba build-up.

The "official sources" Keating mentioned in his subsequent (Nov. 19) interview with US News & World Report, and in other remarks afterward, who were supposed to have confirmed all his information before he publicized it, those sources were never discovered by the Administration. (Hilsman, Hughes)

Hilsman, in LOOK, asserts that "Eight Sen. Keating was peddling someone's rumors for some purpose of his own, despite the highly dangerous international situation; or, alternatively, he had information the US gov't did not have that could have guided a U-2 to the missile sites before October 14, and at less risk to the pilot."

This seems a bit harsh. Hilsman says the flight of Oct. 14 had already been ordered ~~by~~ the 4th. The Administration later admitted that that flight was held up a few days by bad weather conditions. Obviously it takes time to prepare such a flight. This means that Keating would have had to receive his information that much time before the flight took place. Yet Keating said that his tip had not been confirmed on the 9th.

Hilsman also contradicts himself. On Page 18 he said "On October 4—after the decision to fly over western Cuba had already been made—". And before that, also on page 18, he said, "A flight over western Cuba was proposed on Oct. 4, approved at a special meeting on October 9 and readied on the 10th."

Moreover, Hilsman admits that "the evidence does not show that, as a practical matter, the missiles could have been discovered sooner than they were." If, as Hilsman proposes, a plane could have been sent "to the right spot on, say, October 2 or 3, the plane might well have come back with photographic proof." this after admitting that even by Oct. 10, "construction was not far enough along on some of the sites for a refugee or anyone else to recognize them as missile installations," one wonders what photographs would have shown.

Keating's error, then, in the facts of his Oct. 10 speech was in overestimating by 2 the number of IREM sites under construction. He said later the information had come to his attention early in October and had been verified on Oct. 9, though after his Senate speech of the same day. He also said later that all his information was always verified with gov't sources before publication, that there was no need for him to give the information to the gov't because they already had it. His motive for publication probably sprang from discontent with the official distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, and suspicions of either error or skulduggery on the part of the gov't, which had the information and was keeping it under wraps. There is no evidence that he really understood the implications of the situation for US-Soviet relations. No one has said, for example, that he made overtures to the gov't to find out what they intended to do with their information—whether they were preparing a counter-strategy, whether it would be better to keep quiet until final confirmation was made which would permit our contacting the allies for their cooperation in whatever solution was decided upon, whether secrecy of our intelligence was necessary to our country's response to the threat, etc. Partisan politics, combined with native simplicity, strongly defined his reaction to his information. One might ask whether he was sufficiently critical of his sources—how could he be sure without photographs, when our gov't needed the photographs to proceed with the allies and its own strategy? On the three counts, then, of 1) minor inaccuracy, 2) misunderstanding of the implications of the situation, and 3) insufficient skepticism of his information, Keating may justly be criticized. Probably the last two are mutually interdependent, and so should receive the most criticism.

\*\*\*\*(Evans and Novak have charged that the Oct. 10 speech was "cribbed" from an Oct. 7 article by Hal Hendrix in the Miami Daily News, which a reader mailed to Keating in time for the speech. Confirm this carefully.) (Keating has not specifically refuted this, to my knowledge.)

## II - The Dismantled Missile Sites Episode, or, "Who said anything concrete?"

In Congressional Record, Jan. 31, 1963, is recorded this allegation from a speech Keating made on the floor that day:

"The Soviets are maintaining and guarding medium range sites they had previously constructed in Cuba. There has been no Soviet move to dismantle these concrete sites or withdraw the launching bases, as one might expect if the Soviets intended in good faith to keep these missiles out of Cuba in the future."

(Evans and Novak charge that this speech was based on a Jan. 29 story by the anonymous Eastern reporter friend. Confirm this also.)

Representative Stratton said later in the House that McCone visited Keating the next day, Friday, Feb. 1, to inform him it wasn't true. On Sunday Keating appeared on a television show in which the same charge was made. On Monday Keating released to the press repetitions of the charge. A picture circulated widely in the nation showing Keating holding a Minuteman ICBM over a map of Cuba, although there were no charges about ICBM's themselves. Monday also, an interview was published in US News & World Report repeating the charge. In both these Monday incidents, however, the word "concrete" did not appear. On Feb. 1, however, in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Edmund Lambeth of the Gannett News Service asked Keating to describe the sites, which he did, saying they were concrete. On Wednesday an exclusive AP interview with reporters Jack Bell and Fred Hoffman went over the wires (was it published?) in which Keating denied having mentioned the IREM concrete bases, which he admitted were broken up. But the MREM bases, he said, which are of gravel and hard-top, are still there. (Feb. 5.) Rep. Stratton said in the House that gravel or hard-top bases never appeared in intelligence pictures taken over Cuba. Then on Feb. 6, Sec'y of Defense McNamara and special assistant Thomas L. Hughes went on a two-hour nationwide telecast showing authentic intelligence photographs of Cuba, proving conclusively that concrete bases had been dismantled. There was no mention of gravel or hard-top sites. McNamara was quoted in the Times as saying that Keating would have to eat his hat on the basis of the evidence presented. Keating said that none of his charges had been disproved.

This curious incident is difficult to explain. Evans and Novak say that the Jan 29 story by the anonymous friend reporter did not go as far as to mention concrete launching sites still in maintenance, though they claim his speech was based on it. This is possible, because the speech mentions much more than merely the concrete sites in maintenance. The excess in Keating's speech is not explained, and this may be where the Evans-Novak thesis of the purely journalistic basis for Keating's intelligence breaks down; in their anxiety to prove their point, they may themselves have gone beyond the evidence, or given up trying to find the correct source for the Keating concrete allegation. It is entirely possible that Keating never meant to say "concrete," that he just did not think before he spoke; ~~this would explain the variations in the speech~~ Keating's allegation was important because it tended to reinforce the suspicion that there may still have been some missiles tucked away in caves which, as Keating himself said, could be hauled out and readied for firing "in a matter of hours." (Actually, 48 to 72 hours, or a "matter of days." —Hanson Baldwin, Times, June, 1, for timing) The Administration was forced to admit that it could not be sure, without on-sight inspection, that all caves were empty of missiles. In all probability they were, since there had been, from Oct. 23 to Nov. 15, 162 low-level flights, 82 high-level flights, and since then, high level flights on a regular basis, some said daily. (Times, May 10, Stennis subcommittee report.) The Soviets had admitted withdrawing 42 missiles, these had been confirmed, and 42 was more missiles than we had thought they had there. It would have been difficult to hide the missiles in the caves without being discovered. The public was very concerned about these suspicions, and this was complicated further by the hassle over the speed of Soviet withdrawal, to which Keating also contributed (see below). It was this Jan. 31 speech which prompted the unprecedented exposure of our intelligence information, about which many responsible Americans expressed doubt concerning the propriety of the procedure. Such extremes demonstrate Administration anxiety over the Cuban intelligence "crisis of credibility" as Keating called it. (He never said, incidentally, that our intelligence community was failing to get the information—just that top officials <sup>weren't</sup> getting the word.) E and N say that public still believed Keating, despite McNamara's refutation, because Keating had built up a reputation for credibility.

### III. Debate Over Soviet Withdrawal and General Anxiety about Intelligence Community

Since much of this occurred during the newspaper strike in New York, and since I have had to rely on the Western Edition of the Times and the Congressional Record, this section of the report will proceed on a simple chronological basis. The history centers on these issues: 1) the official intelligence estimate in Nov. of the number of Soviet troops in Cuba was wrong by 5,000—it gave 17,500, whereas the truth was 22,500. This was never really admitted until the Stennis report in May. All subsequent numbers games depend on this error and misunderstanding; 2) the purpose of Soviet military technicians in Cuba—Administration contradicted itself, Keating kept firm that they were to subvert other Latin American gov'ts; 3) the presence and definition of "offensive" weapons in Cuba; 4) the proliferation of 1-man investigating committees into American intelligence, and the concomitant rumor-spreading and -mongering that normally attend such conditions in pre-election years. In the midst of the storm, watch Keating's attitude—how he insists that he is above the strife, a responsible, constructive and prudent man; not playing politics like the others, not responsible for them, not to be thought of as being one of them. All this while he feeds the flames.

Also in his Jan 31 speech, Keating charged that that Cuba was being used by the Soviets as a base for further subversion of South America. On Feb. 6 McNamara said, in his telecast, that he had no evidence that such was the case. On Feb. 7 the President said there were no offensive weapons in Cuba, to the best of his knowledge. On Feb. 8 the Times editorial said it may have been a help for Keating and others to goad the Administration into clearing the air, but in another sense they may have done harm in causing Pentagon to reveal more of its own information than could have been good for security, and by doing this (the goading) with "incorrect and exaggerated" information. The Washington Daily News said the performance of McNamara was persuasive, but not totally. Ditto the Evening Star. One of the extreme critics had been Rep Donald C. Bruce of Indiana, who alleged that there were "40 big missiles" in Cuba and he "wouldn't be convinced by anything McNamara told(him) to the contrary. (Wash. Daily News Feb. 7.) (On Feb. 3, Keating had

announced in the Senate that Soviet military strength in Cuba was 10 times what it had been in July, 1962. This was more than should have been the case had withdrawal really occurred. On Feb. 8. Keating met with McCone and gave the latter information on the military forces in Cuba. Neither would say what they were, though Keating said that no offensive invasion of the US was possible from Cuba. On Feb. 10 Keating said that the Soviet buildup in Cuba involves nat'l security and should be kept out of politics. He followed this with rhetorical statements. In the "News of the Week in Review" section of the Times for Feb. 11, 1963, the charges by Keating were summed up as follows:

- 1) "Soviets are maintaining medium range missile sites in Cuba." There was a "very real possibility that Russia...may have missiles (hidden) on the island and needs only to wheel them out of caves."
- 2) "I am sure there are more than 20,000 Soviet troops and technicians but I don't know how many more...6,000 to 8,000 of these would be (combat troops)." There are "more than 150 MIG fighters there. I think they (the troops) present a serious threat to the safety and security of the Western World."

McCone, in reply, had said during the week that there were only defensive weapons in Cuba, that the caves had been checked and all reports were negative. There were, he said, 17,000 men, including 4 combat groups of 1,000-1,200 strength, 102 MIG's and 42 MIG fighter-interceptors. the missiles remaining were of the 30-40 mile range. Keating, in rebuttal, said that this information did not dispute any of his statements. He was, in general, right, taking into account the margin of error necessary in these calculations. The significant difference was between his and McCone's estimation of missiles and caves. On Feb. 12 Mansfield said critics should offer their evidence first to the Administration, then to the public. Keating said the Administration had not given the American people the full facts on the Soviet buildup in Cuba. On Tuesday, Feb. 13, Reston said that charges of offensive weaponry in Cuba are "charges of stupidity, bad faith, or worse, and should be backed up or withdrawn. They confuse and weaken the Country" unless they are supported with evidence. Feb. 14, Krock, bless his soul, defended Keating and others, said they were constructive and responsible. On Feb. 21 there was, with a follow-up and uncritical "Man in the News" story in the Times on Keating, an analytical article guessing at the reasons for his prominence. The story said that his first warnings had proven true, which made him credible, and his second round of warnings (those now under discussion) had polarized further Congressional criticism. They patterned theirs on his, some went further—using higher figures, and calling for more percipient action. This concerned him (Keating). Political considerations had played their part in his actions, but sympathizers insisted that they were not uppermost in his mind. That day, Feb. 21, 1963, occurred the "shrimpboat incident," in which Cuban planes had fired rockets at a couple shrimp boats at sea. Keating on Feb. 22 in the Senate said that it "swept away with rocket fire the silly distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. President Kennedy defined, subsequently, in a news conference, "Offensive" as "having the capacity to carry great damage to the US—bombers, and especially missiles." Keating the same day charged that the "crisis of credibility in the nation today" is not due to an "intelligence gap," but because top Gov't officials gloss over the facts, disbelieve the intelligence sources, and attempt to suppress information entirely. He cited McCone, who on Feb. 19 had contradicted McNamara's previous statement, saying that Cuba was supporting and spurring other revolutionary movements, and that Czech weapons found with revolutionaries in Peru probably came by way of Cuba.

On Mar. 5, Russell Baker said that we have Keating to blame for the rash of 1-man investigating committees on Cuba intelligence. All sorts of stupid and irresponsible damage is being done, he said. he recommends the sale of "Cuba kits"—wall map, actors manual on how to look at it darkly, 15 or 20 lbs. of old newspapers, a series of ominous, implicating press releases, including a declaration of pride that one had not played politics with Cuba. On March 7, 1963, Rep. George Mahon of Texas had said that both the critics and the Administration should keep quiet about intelligence and intelligence gathering concerning Cuba. he spoke of the "immaturity and indiscretion" and "bad judgment" that was rife, and asserted that it was all making a laughing stock of the American people in the eyes of the world. On Mar. 11 Hanson Baldwin remarked in passing that Mahon's observations hadn't convinced many in Congress, because no secrets of information gathering and sources had been revealed. On Mar. 15 in the Times there were unspecified

references to criticisms of Keating by Clark of Pennsylvania and Stratton. On Feb. 25, incidentally, Keating had defended his record in the Senate. he said, in addition to pointing out how often he had been right in opposition to Administration denials, that if Khrushchev withdraws his troops, it will be because of vocal American objections and outrage, not in spite of it. Khrushchev retreats only when he feels the pressure on him is becoming intolerable. A determined American Nation, vocal in its criticism of Soviet imperialism, and strong in its pressure for action, has always carried more weight with Khrushchev than diplomatic note passing. He criticized the Administration for not having a "long-term consistent policy" on Cuba. (Mansfield replied that it was difficult to have a "long-term consistent policy" in any part of the world. Events, he said, make the most careful policies of little use to us. Concluding, Mansfield quietly implied that Keating should not criticize merely for the sake of criticizing. Walter Lippmann spoke of the "unseemly controversy" over who was telling the truth—the President or the Senator. Keating had earned the right to be listened to, and now that there were arrangements for him and the Administration to exchange information, perhaps matters would quiet down.

On Apr. 18, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Keating said that despite Administration reports to the contrary, the number of Soviet troops in Cuba was the same as in mid November, 1962—ca. 17,000. no "functional units" had been withdrawn. widely publicized withdrawals had been accompanied by unwidely publicized entrances. A high Administ. source said that their figures differed—that 4,600 had left, only 150 had arrived, and that in the last 2 months rumors similar to Keating's report had been checked out and demonstrated to be false. (As for Keating's suggestions concerning Cuban policy, Walter Lippmann said that his was no different than Rusk's and other Administration spokesmen who addressed the same group.) On April 20, Nixon called for a "command decision" to get the Russians out of Cuba. Keating said he hoped we could "clear up the Cuban problem and shove it into the background as a partisan issue in 1964." (!) On Apr. 24 President Kennedy commented on Keating's charges at a news conference. The Administration had the information of the coordinated intelligence community; it asked Congressmen to give them his sources if he has information contrary to theirs, so it can be evaluated. (Earlier in the year, when Rep. Bruce and others were giving their wild estimates of contrary information, the President also wished aloud that these critics would provide their sources of information to the Administration—"We are not, after all, a foreign power," he said then.) Now our best evidence, he continued, is that 4,000 left in March, some in April; equipment had not been substantially reduced, but none had been introduced. But, he said, a debate over 4,000 is not much—there are still substantial numbers there. The debate is not important because there was no challenge of good faith on either side. but only 3-400 have come in. (The President was clearly trying to quiet things down, sensing that Keating wanted the same thing on the basis of his recent remark. Keating was not mentioned directly in the President's remark about sources of information.) Keating replied that he was not, indeed, challenging anyone's good faith, but that "if the President will consult his own intelligence community he will revise his estimates upwards." In an Apr. 26 letter to the Times, Keating remarked that the presence of Soviet troops and armaments in Cuba and the plight of Cuba (about which a Times editorial said the Cuba critics were losing sight) were closely related; that a Communist stronghold in Cuba was not only a bar to political and economic progress but a threat to reform throughout Latin America. On April 29 in a lead editorial in the Times entitled "Cloudy Intelligence," it was observed that the conflict between Keating and Kennedy could reflect a serious weakness in the elaborate intelligence apparatus. Keating, after all, claimed to be getting his information from gov't intelligence agencies. In this context, the appointment of Clark M. Clifford to a high intelligence post was ill-advised, since he had been a partisan figure in the past. Rep. Stratton, in a letter dated May 1, published later in the Times and addressed to the editorial just mentioned, said: Keating claims to have sources more reliable than gov't intelligence agencies. It is not true that he is getting his information from "Gov't intelligence agencies." He has refused to identify any of his sources, but couldn't have been getting them there, because, "as I have often proved," his information has been variously vague, misleading, self-contradictory, and downright false. The gov't was



checking out the rumors that were circulating in Washington before the crisis, and none of them proved out until the October 14 flight, which had been ordered before Keating publicized his own rumor. As of then he had no more information than anyone else, and his information was markedly different from what the gov't uncovered. The evanescent quality of his private intelligence was shown in his Jan 31st speech, which McNamara conclusively refuted and which refutation Keating has never really come to grips with. The burden of proof should be on the one who challenges official estimates, yet Senator Keating has never made an honest effort to substantiate his challenges. His kind of conduct leads to a lack of confidence, which the Times evidenced in its Apr. 29 editorial. On May 5 Stratton said that the "fright mail" which Sen. Kuchel was then decrying had undoubtedly "gone way up" since Keating began his campaign of fear and misrepresentation.

On May 10 the Stennis subcommittee of the Senate, which had promised to investigate the intelligence community's behavior in the Cuban situation, published its report. It said: at least 17,500 Russians, including 5,000 combat troops, were still in Cuba; it was "quite possible" that Soviet missiles are concealed in caves and could be deployed "in a matter of hours;" but the intelligence agencies unanimously believed that all Soviet strategic missiles and bombers with enough range to reach this country had been withdrawn; official intelligence groups believe 9,000 to 10,000 had been withdrawn, other sources, notably refugee and exile groups believed as many as 14,000 were still on the island. The present estimate was based on the lack of proof to the contrary. There was no "photography gap" between Sept. 5 and October 14, as had been alleged after the McNamara presentation. Only hindsight permits criticism. The number of Soviet troops had been substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. We said then there were 8-10,000; now we say there were 22,000 then, and that 4-5000 had been withdrawn, leaving 17,500 there now. Nevertheless, the intelligence chiefs believe that the Communist forces in Cuba do not now present a direct aggressive military threat to the US or Latin America. The subversion going on is a grave matter. On May 12 Keating appeared on Meet the Press to comment on the report. He said that none of his charges on Cuba had ever been proved wrong. After the program, Stratton issued a challenge to debate Keating on this fact, and Keating replied that the matter was too serious for partisan debate. On May 16 Stratton addressed the House concerning the Stennis report, saying that although the charges had been refuted, the defendant was not acquitted—the report had hedged. As evidence, he pointed out that there had been no evidence of a photography gap from Sept. 5-Oct. 14, that the report contradicted itself in accepting that no evidence had confirmed the presence of missiles in Cuba before the crisis, then criticized the community for not so confirming. As for the allegation that the top gov't officials ~~dis~~believed the missile reports under the assumption that the Soviets wouldn't do such a thing, McCone was an obvious case to the contrary, as Sen Jackson pointed out on p. 7733 of the May 9 Record. On June 1, Hanson Baldwin gave the figures on how long it would take to ready a naved missile for firing. He also said that no one could tell how many Russians were in Cuba. He said there was no evidence supporting the contention that there were submarine bases in Cuba. He criticized the centralization of the intelligence agencies, adducing to support his argument the opinions that there was increased danger of minority reports getting lost in the bureaucratic shuffle, and a greater danger of political influence under centralization. On June 20, Tad Szulc reported that the latest estimates show 12,500 Russian military men in Cuba; that 500-1,000 had left after the Apr. 3 news conference, 4,000 had left during March, 5,000 had left since November, with no evidence of later entry. The earlier figure for November, 17,500, had been wrong. On Apr. 3, there were 13,000 or 13,500 there, so about 1,000 had left in the last 2½ months. The Administration officials had expressed regret at the public controversy over the numbers game. On July 12, the Evans and Novak story appeared in the Herald Tribune: "It was Washington at its wackiest when Sen. Kenneth B. Keating parlayed a few tips, a hard working staff and unlimited gall into overnight recognition as the nation's No. 1 Cuba expert. The source is Washington's best kept secret, but although everyone suspects there was a "Gov't leak," he had no direct gov't informants. His chief source was a reporter who gave Keating remarkably reliable tips after their publication back home in an Eastern newspaper not generally read in Washington." "The full story can now be told."...The Keating intelligence agency pruned published sources, checked through normal gov't channels of communication, and snared minor tidbits from refugee leaders. Sometimes they had to laugh at public gullibility. On July 17, Stratton dared Keating to file a libel suit against

Evans and Novak or apologize for frightening millions of Americans. He said "The Bubble has burst." The next day Keating said that he had never made information public without checking it through official gov't sources. His sources were two-fold: "official Gov't sources—not the top, but others lower down, and to a lesser extent, a variety of people whose reports we always confirmed by official official gov't sources before I spoke about them publicly. If this information came from newsmen, they were certainly highly accurate."

On Nov. 29 Baldwin said that the Cuba force had gone down to 5-9,000 in the last 8 months. On June 15, 1964, he noted that withdrawal seemed to have stopped with 4-7,000 remaining. On August 5, 1964, Keating said he had never spoken in a partisan vein.

Thus ends the chronicle. A few observations:

1) Keating's only error in the arithmetic of troop withdrawal was in insisting that the 5,000 which had been withdrawn had been replaced by 5,000 new men. It seems probable that the error arose in the following manner: The official figures for Soviet human complement in Cuba as of November were 17,500--a figure which was never withdrawn. Keating found around the first of the year that there were 17,500 troops there. The Administration had claimed, and probably Keating's sources checked this out, that the 5,000 withdrawal had taken place. He probably put two and two together, and figured that 5,000 had entered, and not been reported. He probably also knew that the Administration also thought there were 17,500 men there. If these methodological assumptions are correct, it throws interesting light on Keating's intelligence. His error was in leaping to conclusions.

2) In the New York Times profile of Keating which appeared after he announced his candidacy, it was hypothesized that he got his information from a specific paper, I think a Buffalo paper. Find out what it was, and check it against the Evans-Novak hypothesis.

3) Also get the Miami Daily News article mentioned above.

4) It is risky to get into a debate about intelligence figures and their proper proof; no one can doubt that Keating's sources were remarkably accurate. His techniques and motives, and the results of his actions may legitimately be questioned, and all are in the record.

5) Since the submarine episode was never publicized by Keating, to my knowledge, it should probably be left out. It does show that some of his information was inaccurate, but that was bound to be the case and we know that anyway.

6) Evans and Novak should be approached to find out all they know.

7) Keating said that one concrete result of this disclosures was that an aroused American public opinion aided in forcing Khrushchev to withdraw from Cuba. President Kennedy thought that it was dangerous to arouse such pressure, because it made such withdrawal more embarrassing for the other side. These two views of diplomatic tactics might offer fruitful grounds for debate.

8) One of the results of Keating's disclosures was that many others got into the act--it snowballed. This could have been foreseen; when one man stands up and gives information critical of the Administration, in a situation where he neither offers substantiation nor is compelled to offer substantiation, there is no check on irresponsibility. So a Pandora's box situation resulted. The dangers such methods imply for democratic gov't are legitimate grounds for debate. Keating protested throughout, and more often as the situation got further out of hand, that he was responsible, prudent, constructive, etc. But a responsible, prudent, and constructive statesman probably would not have opened Pandora's box.

9) It would help if Mr. Kennedy could get or give a statement indicating from high places in the Administration that Keating's actions were a disservice to the country.

10) The issues should be sharply drawn: What did Keating want to do with his disclosures? Why didn't he handle his information in other ways? How did he check his information and what were his sources? What good does he think came out of it--specifically and concretely? How does he explain the inaccuracies, (which should be named at the outset)? Did he foresee what irresponsibility would follow from others, and if so, why did he go ahead? What steps did he take to prevent the situation from getting out of hand--did he ever criticize the other critics of the Administration, or did he stick to the Administration?